The Trincerone of Grigno

The concrete Trincerone of Grigno, the heart of the Italian barrier across Val Brenta, strengthened after the Strafexpedition of 1916.

The concrete Trincerone of Grigno, the heart of the Italian barrier across Val Brenta, strengthened after the Strafexpedition of 1916.

THE TRINCERONE: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE VAL BRENTA BARRIER AT GRIGNO

Before the Great War, the border defences built by the Kingdom of Italy along the Canal di Brenta, as part of the so-called “Brenta-Cismon fortress”, were based on two large road-barrier forts: one at the bend in the valley at Primolano, the other at the Tombion narrows, between Primolano and Cismon. The first, a vast fortified complex made up of the “della Scala” and “delle Fontanelle” road barriers, nevertheless had only a limited field of action, because it lay in the hollow that the Brenta valley forms at that point. The range of the guns emplaced in the Tombion work, at the bottom of the narrow canyon now followed by the railway and the expressway, was even shorter. To partly remedy these shortcomings, two further works had been completed by 1914: the two barbette batteries of Col del Gallo (the upper and the lower work, later supplemented by the more advanced emplacement of Colle della Spina above the village of S. Vito) and, above all, the cavern battery of Coldarco, on the right bank of the Brenta, just below Enego.

Faced with the imposing Italian fortification works in the border zone on the valley floor, begun in 1882 and resumed with renewed vigour in 1906 after an interruption of almost ten years (1896-1905) following the military disaster at Adwa, the Austro-Hungarian military administration had remained almost entirely passive: only around 1904 did the first plans appear to strengthen the defence of the eastern side of Italian-speaking Tyrol with armoured works, to be built both on the left bank of the Brenta at Col Balestrina (today Col della Cimogna, near the “Il Cacciatore” restaurant on the Celado plateau) and on Monte Picosta, and on the orographic right of the river, on the Colle di Val d’Antenne. To close off Valsugana, the “Sperre Grigno” (Grigno barrier) envisaged a complex of no fewer than six costly armoured works of the most modern design; but the Dual Monarchy’s chronic shortage of funds and the outright hostility of the Hungarian component of the imperial government to any spending on the military strengthening of the border with Italy (given – so the objection ran – the far greater threat posed by the armies of the boundless Russian Empire) led to the complete abandonment of every further fortification project. The only effective Austrian armoured defences in the Brenta valley remained the by then obsolete forts of Tenna and Colle delle Benne, near the lakes of Levico and Caldonazzo.

May 1915: the occupation of Tezze and Grigno

From the outbreak of the war between Italy and Austria (24 May 1915), however, the strategic choice of the Habsburg monarchy made the permanent fortifications previously built by Italy near the border essentially useless. By withdrawing its meagre defensive deployment to a line that ran from the basin of the lakes of Levico and Caldonazzo along the main ridge of the Lagorai as far as Passo Rolle, Austria-Hungary in effect moved the Valsugana front inside Habsburg territory, well beyond the range of the guns installed in the forts of the Brenta-Cismon barrier. With this move, the empire of the double-headed eagle undoubtedly succeeded brilliantly in nullifying the enemy’s superiority in border fortifications. Unfortunately, no such effort was made by the military and civil administration of the County of Tyrol – the Borgo district authority – to ensure the safety of the civilian population, which was essentially left to fend for itself, even though it had long been clear to most people that war with Italy was by now not only inevitable but also imminent. The inhabitants of lower Valsugana, from Roncegno downwards, were simply advised to leave the villages quickly and head towards Trento, from where they would then be sent on elsewhere to wait for the end of the conflict. On 24 May 1915, therefore, the only people missing from Grigno and Tezze were in practice the soldiers called up from August 1914 onwards: almost all the rest of the population was still living quietly in the two villages, despite the withdrawal of the military, the gendarmerie and the civil administration staff.

Although on the first day of the war the Italian troops on the valley floor had not moved beyond the border (while on the heights on either side the flanking units had occupied the Barricata basin and the Celado plateau), on 25 May the 43rd Bersaglieri Battalion occupied Tezze, setting out from Primolano with its headquarters and two companies. The advance was supported on the right by a third company, which moved from Fastro Bassanese across the valley side at mid-slope before finally descending to the plain at Fontanelle. By 6:30 in the morning of the 25th the plumed Bersaglieri had complete control of the village, and by around 8:00 more than 250 men were deployed in outposts between Filipini and Palù. During the action, a strong patrol of the Regia Guardia di Finanza (Royal Finance Guard) led by the commander of the Enego post, Warrant Officer Gaetano Pizzighella (who would be killed in action at Cristo d’Oro, near Samone, on the following 26 June), surprised two Austrian soldiers detached to support the gendarmerie: they were the first prisoners of war in the Brenta-Cismon sector. Four days later, on 30 May, two battalions of the 83rd Infantry Regiment of the Venezia Brigade and a battery of the 19th Field Artillery Regiment (with 4 guns) occupied Grigno, moved beyond it and deployed on the Selva – osteria del Tollo line without meeting any enemy unit. Five days later, the entire Italian deployment on the valley floor was moved forward, without meeting resistance, as far as the Ospedaletto narrows (ponte dei Gobi, level with the railway station): Grigno and Tezze had already become the “immediate rear area” of the front.

Rear defences neglected until the Strafexpedition

At first, on 5 June 1915, the Italian line thus seemed to settle at Ospedaletto, where modest field works were begun to block the valley level with the railway station, resting on the slopes of Cima Caldiera to the south and on the strategic Monte Lefre to the north. But the Italian advance, which in the first three months of the war proceeded almost unopposed as far as the Borgo basin, meant that the royal troops needed a sufficient mass of artillery on the newly reached positions; the shortage of siege guns made it “acceptable” to replace them with personnel and guns of the fortress artillery previously deployed in the border barrier forts. Equally useful for setting up the new field works were the engineers’ equipment park and the sapper units from the Brenta-Cismon Fortress. Given this “hunger” for technical units and materials for the new field fortifications, it is not surprising that the Italians paid little attention to laying out and, above all, consolidating rear lines of defence: everything that gradually became available in terms of men and equipment went into strengthening the recently gained forward lines.

During the second half of 1915 and up to May 1916 the Italian front advanced slowly until it lay right up against the main Austrian line of defence, but without managing to dent it appreciably. In Valsugana in particular, the intense Italian pressure of March–April 1916 between Val di Sella, Novaledo, Monte Broi and S. Osvaldo (on the slopes of the Panarotta) provoked an extremely violent Austrian reaction which, besides inflicting heavy losses and forcing a drastic withdrawal of the line to Roncegno and Marter, made clear to the Italian commands the need to prepare rear barriers along Valsugana capable of containing any enemy offensive. But by then the “Spring Offensive in South Tyrol” – as the Austrian commands officially called the “Strafexpedition” – was imminent, and all the resources and energies of the Italian forces had been spent on strengthening the forward line Val di Sella – Zaccon – Larganza – Roncegno – Monte Collo and the main line Val di Sella – Armentera – S. Giorgio – Borgo – Ciolino – Salubio.

When the unexpected success of the diversionary actions organised by the Austro-Hungarians in Val di Sella opened the way for them along the Moggio stream as far as Olle, causing the collapse of both the Italian forward line and the main line, the royal troops retreating from the Borgo – Scurelle – Strigno – Agnedo basin found no prepared strongpoints on which to make a stand, except on Monte Civeron. On the valley floor, the lack of field works ready for use created a potentially disastrous “cul de sac”, because the Italian line, anchored to the south on the Civeron and to the north on the heights of Samone – Strigno – Castel Ivano, bent dangerously inwards in the centre, along the Brenta, where Villa, Agnedo, Ivano and Fracena, the locality of Barricata di Agnedo and the whole wooded area of the Mesole as far as Ospedaletto had been abandoned. It was precisely this inward bend that made the Civeron strongpoint vulnerable, and indeed it fell on 26 May, attacked from three sides. In stemming the Austrian advance, the works begun in June 1915, and later suspended, for the Ospedaletto barrier proved extremely useful: from the end of May 1916 to November 1917 this barrier was the most important strongpoint of the main Italian line on the valley floor.

After the Austrian offensive: the Grigno barrier

The Austrian offensive, however, had dramatically exposed the absence of any significant defensive structures in Valsugana behind the front lines, revealing the enormous risks to which a breakthrough would have exposed the entire deployment and the adjacent northern and southern sectors. This explains the sudden resumption, with vastly greater resources, of the fortification works already begun in 1915 but then neglected for lack of time, men and materials. Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Dal Fabbro, formerly director of engineers of the Brenta-Cismon Barrier and later commander of engineers of the 15th Division in Valsugana, was tasked with drawing up an overall plan for a series of reinforcements on the lines chosen by the higher commands.

The Italian defence of the Valsugana valley floor was thus organised in several successive systems of field fortification, each centred on a continuous trench line blocking the flat, more vulnerable part of the valley trough; on the sides, where the bordering mountain slopes rose steeply towards the Sette Comuni (Asiago) plateau and towards Monte Lefre and the Monte Mezza massif, strongpoints for artillery and machine guns were planned, able to support the trenches below with crossfire and enfilading fire. A first trench line was thus consolidated from one side of the valley to the other, on earlier works from 1915, level with Ospedaletto railway station (“ponte dei Gobi”); in front of it lay a so-called “observation” line, made up not of continuous trenches but of independent strongpoints capable of all-round (360-degree) defence, on the left embankment of the Chieppena stream. An outpost stood west of the Chieppena, at Strigno – Agnedo railway station. Behind the Ospedaletto line, which was an integral part of the main line of resistance, the so-called “Val Brenta barrier at Grigno” was gradually organised, followed further east by the “Val Brenta barrier at Tezze” (built between the village of Tezze and the hamlet of Martincelli).

The Grigno barrier was of great importance for the resistance of the whole sector: even if the Ospedaletto line had given way, it would not have been necessary to evacuate the northern sector and abandon the Samone – Strigno – Bieno – Monte Lefre line, nor the Tesino plateau, as long as the Grigno line held. It protected, in fact, the main supply artery of the entire sector of the Cime di Rava and the Tesino, namely the Grigno – Castel Tesino road, built by the Italian military as early as 1915 on the orographic left side of Val Grigno. Arriving by rail at Grigno, reinforcements of men and materials could have been sent safely up to the front line without fear of being outflanked.

The two defensive belts and the Trincerone

Because of its importance, the Grigno barrier relied on a “layered” defence in two belts. A first trench line closed the valley between the hamlet of Selva and the place called “osteria Tollo”: it was a continuous line consisting of an open earthen trench, reinforced with timber and sandbags and covered with sloping wire netting as protection against hand grenades. The line was interrupted in the middle of the valley, in the wide gravel bed of the Brenta, where any field work was essentially impossible, while on the left bank of the Brenta it doubled between Tollo and “osteria Puele”. A 20-metre-wide belt of barbed-wire entanglements in five rows protected the infantry position, while from Selva to the “Bigonda” spring a series of flanking emplacements made it possible to strike any attacker in the right flank. In the central part, the bed of the Brenta was blocked by tangles of “wire chain”.

The second “defensive layer”, the main one, had been built level with the village of Grigno. In practice, the left embankment of the stream, from the village to its confluence with the Brenta, had been transformed, cut back and raised: thus the “Trincerone di Grigno” came into being, a mighty field work consisting of a very long covered position with concrete walls and numerous rear entrances (almost one every ten metres), closed by wooden doors and protected by high walls of earth and sandbags. The roof, also of thick concrete, ran the entire length of the work: according to the design documents, still held in the archive of the Genio militare (the Italian military engineers) in Rome, it was to have been strengthened with armour consisting of a metal plate embedded in the concrete, but no trace of this reinforcement exists in any of the sections where it has been possible to examine the thickness of the vault. Instead, one finds a sparse and rough mesh of wire netting.

Inside, seen in cross-section, the Trincerone had a “service corridor”, intended for what we might call “lateral mobility” and reserved for movement, ammunition supply and the evacuation of the wounded. In front of it was the “fire step”, a sort of narrow raised walkway giving access to the loopholes in the western side of the work, facing the Grigno stream. The fire step was reached by an intermediate step, also made of concrete. The interior of the fortification could be lit electrically, and there were numerous telephone points. Particular care had gone into the loopholes: each rifleman’s position had a rectangular opening in the concrete mass at the front, and each opening was protected by a steel plate almost one centimetre thick, held in place by four sturdy metal pins. This additional shield had a transverse slit with rounded corners in its centre, through which aimed fire could be delivered. Immediately behind the main structure of the fortification, below ground level, three large protected chambers had been made at regular intervals, in which the garrison’s commands and reserves could take shelter.

Barbed wire, mines and machine guns around the Trincerone

Starting upstream of the village, the fortification passed without interruption beneath the imperial road and also beneath the railway line, where special reinforcing works had been built that are unfortunately no longer visible. The bed of the Grigno stream was completely blocked by wire gabions and by wire chain, which was also used liberally at the confluence with the Brenta. Pull-activated anti-personnel mines, known as “land torpedoes”, were scattered in profusion across the wide and largely dry streambed. Beyond the watercourse, towards the potential attacker, three more barbed-wire obstacles on two-metre-high wooden stakes, each about 20 metres wide, completed the defence. A “lateral communication” road, the southern continuation of the Val Grigno road, branched off the imperial road and ran across the fields a few dozen metres behind the line, giving access to the supply lorries. To the north, on the hill of San Udalrico, numerous machine-gun positions in caverns and in Blockhaus emplacements commanded the valley-floor fields west of the Grigno. To the south, beyond the confluence of the Grigno with the Brenta, the Trincerone continued for several dozen metres along the left embankment of the Brenta itself, so as to sweep its bed together with similar emplacements on the right bank. From the confluence, the triple belt of barbed wire then turned at a right angle towards the west and ran towards the slopes of the Pizzo, protecting a field trench system that climbed to point 600 and had an advanced corner strongpoint, at low altitude, at the place called “Bersaglio”. The whole trench sector on the right bank of the Brenta, further forward than the Trincerone, made it possible to strike in the right flank any enemy advancing along the valley floor directly against the Trincerone itself. To the north, the right wing of the Trincerone was also protected by the slopes of the Sasso Rosso.

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